SudanRevolts – An illusion or disillusion?!
“The challenge of modernity is to live without illusions and without becoming disillusioned.” Antonio Gramsci
Amgad Fareid Eltayeb
What is happening in Sudan? Certainly, a lot is happening but no one has really provided a comprehensive and concrete description of it. In only one month, the government announced two coup attempts. The first coup(Nov. 2012) attempt was led by senior figures of the regime– both in armed forces and security services – whomwere always seen as the regime protectors since the coup that brought the current regime to powerin 1989. The crackdowns within the government cabinet itself was a recognized phenomenon in the previous few months; for example the Minister of Foreign Affairs Ali Karti had opened direct fire and was openly critical of the Minister of Defence following the air strike on Khartoum based AlYarmook military factory -which Israel was accused of being responsible for. In addition, the Minister of Social Welfare,AmiraAlfadilhad a loud critical argument with the Minister of Finance while presenting the 2013 budget to parliament;raising the question of whether this budget passed through the cabinet in the first place. Not to mention the serious controversy in which the last General Assembly of the Sudanese Islamic movement -which is the ideological womb of the ruling National Congress Party – in November 2012 (few days prior to the coup attempts), ended with, leading to some prominent governmental and Islamic figures outwardly announcing their disagreements.
The first coup attempt was said to be led by General Salah Gosh, who was the previous head of the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) for a long time. Gosh is also recognized as the one behind the huge expansion of the work and the structure of the NISS, which led to similar expansions on its expenditure, power, and of course legislation of many of its frequent violations .Gosh worked for NISS since the 1989 successful coup and he himself participated(according to testimonies) in arresting and torturing many of the political figures and activists since then – including the last democratically elected Prime Minister;ElSadig El Mahdi - in what is known as Ghost houses (secret political prisons of NISS that witnessed and still witnessing many of the regime violations) since then. He was removed from power by president Bashir in April 2011 after speculations of his ambition to step up and take president seat spread widely specially with the critical position of Albashir as a president wanted by international justice during his presidency which make it almost impossible for him to maintain his duties and represent the country in front of the international community which Gosh has stronger ties with it. It wasn’t odd that Gosh failed attempt includedmany other second lineIslamistsespecially from the younger generation who are looking for their chance at power. That younger generation is composed mainly of military Jihadists who are still proud of their crimes in the South and Darfur perceive it as a divine duty that they had accomplished. The second known face in the coup attempt is Col. Mohammed Ibrahim, who is a radical officer within the Special Forces of Sudanese Arm Forces. He is a very a popular figure as well among the younger generation of Islamists as brave and beloved leader. The man was said to be the leader of the Special Forces in Darfur and Port-Sudan city in the east and the leader of many operations during the civil war with the south during his military life, and obviously, responsible for the crimes committed there.In addition to them the previous leader of Sudanese-Chadian joint forces; Fatah AlraheemAbdallaSulliman is also arrested for his participation in the failed attempt, and in the context of the Darfurian complex we can see the importance of the man position.
This group of second generation Islamists name themselves the (Saee’hoon) which an Islamic word derived from Quran meaning the fasting fighters or fating Jihadists. They have multiple representations of themselves, Sometimes they present a face calling for reunion of the Islamic movement after the 1998 split in which Hassan Alturabi, who was the formal theorist of the regime that time and the historical political leader of the Islamic movement in Sudan, went out of the National Congress Party (NCP) and formed the Popular Congress Party (PCP), ( The Saee’hoon group includes members of both parties), in other occasions they present themselves as radical reformers who are angry at the regime mismanagement, corruption and its detach of the Islamic ideological background and provide serious remarks on the government performance (specially the performance of the Minister of defence and loudly questioning his capacity to lead Sudan Armed Forces; SAF), and an another face calling for democratic transformation and reform of both state and Islamic movement. The truth reflected from those inconsistencies, that they are just power seekers in an internal generations struggle within the regime. Some faces within the government board haven’t been changed for 23 years which is the regime time in power and it is expected – due to the regime internal equilibria- never to.
This is only one side of story which actually standalone from the actual Sudanese context. The internal power struggle among the regime is completely detached of the widely spreading notion of change in the streets of Sudan. Maybe, this notion led to the apparent weakening of the government and its political apparatus which helped in firing up the crackdown within the regime, but the aims and objectives are far from each other. The regime and its ideological supporters are ready to fight and oppress any popular demand movement as one. The last wide-spread demonstrations in June-July 2012 against the Austerity measures took by the government and led to over 300% increase in the prices and over 200% drop of the purchasing power of the Sudanese Pound in response to the inflation rate that reaches 45% after series of political games and failed attempts to reach a fair agreement with the government of South Sudan on the oil export fees via the pipe line crosses North Sudan land, didn’t witness any participation of those groups. They don’t even refer to it or its reasonswhen justifying their position from the regime although the wide popular notion of it which led to the arrest of more than 2000 detainees in less than one month . Nor their voices were heard upon the wave of anger that pervaded the country following the found of the bodies of four students dead in a sluiceway following their arrest by security forces from a student forum demanding the application of the wavier of tuition fees for Darfurian students as stated in article 14 of Doha agreement for peace in Darfur. This wave manifested in series of demonstrations and riots in which all political entities in Sudan responded to with a clear condemnation of the government and its security agencies. As well nothing was heard from that side regarding the reigniting of war in different areas of Sudan. Saee’hoon and the rest of Islamic reformists seem to know very well that obeying the street demands means the demise of the power cake that they are fighting over. That is why the street is indifferent towards the internal crackdowns among the regime. While the reasons that led to the unrest in the streets are still present and growing deeper every day, none of the rival factions are addressing streets’ concerns or promising any change or good in the life of the ordinary people.
With the war continues, the economy continues its endless drop specially with failure of negotiations to reach an agreement with South Sudan regarding the oil export sentencing the already debatable proposed budget for 2013 to early death, and the outskirts rioting in silence (people of Babnosa area in mid-west Sudan are entering their third week of their public strike for demands of local development, People of Almanaseer had an agreement with the government to compensate them for their losses caused by the construction of Marwi dam after 2 months of public sit-in and the failure of the government to maintain its obligation led them to start moving again, not forgetting the very active demand movement of the doctors, health workers, teachers, journalists which joined recently by the general union of Sudanese labour in response to the government refusal to raise the minimum wage in 2013 budget (from the current 32 USD monthly to about 65 USD proposed by the union), in addition to the worst ever humanitarian situation lived by the people of Nuba Mountain, Blue Nile and Darfur and other war zones of Sudan, the regime ability to maintain its power seat without committing serious violations and violent measures, is seriously questioned. These measures have already started; last week on the 19th of Dec. 2012 security forces have attacked a peaceful march of the teachers committee heading to the parliament to deliver a petition demanding increasing teachers payments and arrest the head of the committee in addition to two other teachers, As well 4 students’ leaders of Darfur students association are being detained by security forces in unknown places in Khartoum after the wave of anger that swept the country following the found of bodies of 4 Darfurian students dead, and the attack on the civil societies and the Non-Governmental Organizations is being emerged; after a threatening visit to AlkhatimAdlan Centre for enlightenment and human development took place in Nov. 2012, the security forces shut down the centre of Sudanese studies on the 24th of Dec. and previously on that month it stopped the announcement of the Sudanese Federation of Civil Societies.
There is actually no practical reason that keeps this regime alive, but the momentum of protesta is still far from producing a well mature revolution. Governments and regimes can’t be toppled and political and social rights can’t be gained by sporadic riots and demonstrations regardless how wide spread they are. What is needed is a general public strike, when a substantial proportion of the labour force decides to stop working till achieving their demands and subsequently stop the regime ability to run the state apparatus. Although of the active demand movement among all professions in Sudan in addition to the popular unrest of the government in the streets, this is still far from being achieved in Sudan. More coordination is still needed between these groups especially with the apparent apolitical notion marking their movement. There is another reason of the regime survival, the international community is still supporting it and turning a blind eye on its crimes. The last report of the International crisis group (ICG) about Sudan (dated Dec. 2012) is recommending the world and its decision makers to continue supporting internal transformation within the regime its self in what is became publically referred to as a soft landing deal. Such deal is not accepted by large proportion of the Sudanese people for it allows safe exit for the regime figures and doesn’t take persecutions for the crimes committed during the life time of the regime in account. It is a myth that the dissolve of the regime will lead to a national crisis and may cause more unrest in the region. Actually, the opposite is the truth; the price of the regime to go is far less than the cost of its survival now.
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Ghazi Salah Eldin is a senior figure on both the Islamic movement and the ruling NCP and he was the preferred candidate of the younger generation to be elected as secretary general of the movement but he withdrew after new structure of the movement is approved by the congress making this position almost powerless and merely ceremonial position. He didn’t attend the last day of the congress and wrote an open article published in newspapers calling for disengagement of the Islamic Movement from the ruling party. Other Islamic figures like Hasan Maki and Gosh himself didn’t attend the congress from the start.
The 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, which ended more than 20 years of civil war, calls for national elections and law reforms as part of a process of "democratic transformation" over a six-year interim period, at the end of which the people of southern Sudan are to vote on self-determination. Nevertheless, the national security bill endorsed by the ruling party that had the majority in the parliament that time retained broad powers of arrest, detention, search and seizure, and immunities for national security personnel.
Several reports from both national and international human rights groups estimates the number of detainees in June-July uprising to reach 2000, although it was difficult to confirm the exact number. Please see the following links: http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/07/11/sudan-torture-abuse-demonstrators , http://www.amnesty.org/en/for-media/press-releases/sudan-torture-abuse-demonstrators-charge-or-release-detained-peaceful-prote
